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Although there is a large theoretical literature concerning tax and expenditure competition 
between local governments, there is relatively little empirical evidence concerning whether 
such competition actually occurs.  In the context of U.S. public school districts, the fiscal 
behavior of one district could affect the revenue decisions of other, nearby districts. Using 
financial and geographic data for every school district in the U.S. from 1972 to 2002, this 
paper estimates the magnitude of fiscal spillovers between districts.  The results confirm that 
districts' revenues are influenced by exogenous shocks in their neighbors' revenues, especially 
for districts that are already outspending their neighbors.  A one dollar increase in the mean 
revenues per pupil of nearby districts leads to about a 20 cent increase in a district’s own 
revenues per pupil.  These results have important implications for the optimal design of 
school finance programs. 
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| 1 | INTRODUCTION 
n order to fully understand the political economy of local government spending and 
taxation decisions, one must understand whether one locality’s decision will influence 
other localities’ decisions.  Fiscal spillovers could result from fiscal competition between 
localities and from households’ residential location decisions.  Considering the potential 
importance of fiscal spillovers between local governments, there is relatively little prior 
evidence concerning whether they actually occur.  Empirically, it is difficult to determine 
how much of the correlation in the tax and expenditure decisions of localities is due to 
spillovers as opposed to common underlying trends influencing these decisions, (e.g., 
unobserved demographic changes, common responses to changes in the local fiscal 
environment, etc.).  If some portion of the changes in nearby localities’ fiscal changes is 
exogenous, then one can use an instrumental variables approach to identify the impact of 
spillovers.  Yet most factors influencing nearby districts’ expenditures are also directly related 
to a district’s own expenditures, so it is difficult to find a valid instrumental variable.     
 
This paper empirically tests for fiscal spillovers between U.S. public school districts using two 
types of instrumental variable strategies.  The first strategy predicts neighboring districts’ 
fiscal behavior using observationally similar but geographically distant districts located in the 
same state.  The second strategy examines whether districts located near state borders 
respond to the predicted fiscal behavior of neighboring districts located in a different state.  
The fiscal behavior of the out-of-state neighboring districts will often be driven by changes in 
their states’ finance formulas or other state-specific trends that are plausibly unrelated to 
factors affecting the in-state, border district.  The instruments in each of these strategies are 
very powerful predictors of the actual fiscal behavior of neighboring districts, and the 
empirical analyses include several robustness checks from which one can infer both the 
internal validity and external validity of the estimates derived from each approach.     
 
The results suggest that a one dollar increase in the mean per pupil operating revenues of 
nearby districts causes a district to increase its own per pupil operating revenues by about 20 
cents.  While this paper cannot rule out several theoretical explanations for this mean 
response, exploring heterogeneous responses helps to reveal which mechanisms are most 
consistent with observed behavior.  The response is much stronger if a district had previously 
been outspending its neighbors.  The responses also vary based on the form of local 
democracy used to determine local tax rates and based on whether the district is located in a 
metropolitan area.  As expected, one does not observe fiscal spillovers in the few places where 
districts lack local discretion over their operating revenues.  Spillovers are smaller across 
districts in the same metropolitan area and the same state, because positive effects related to 
fiscal competition are reduced by negative effects related to households engaging in Tiebout 
(1956) resorting across districts.  In metropolitan areas, an increase in the revenues of nearby, 
in-state districts leads to an influx of residents with relatively low household incomes.   
 
The next section briefly summarizes the theoretical reasons why school districts’ operating 
revenues might be influenced by the operating revenues of nearby districts.  Sections 3 and 4 
describe the empirical methodologies and data used to test for spillovers.  Section 5 presents 
the main results, Section 6 discusses these results and presents additional analyses which shed 
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light on the mechanisms for fiscal spillovers, and Section 7 briefly concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of these findings. 
 
 
| 2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH 
here are several mechanisms by which school districts’ fiscal decisions may affect the 
fiscal decisions of nearby districts.  There are three mechanisms which would cause a 
positive correlation between nearby districts’ revenue levels.  First, there may be 
traditional tax competition, school districts restraining tax rates in order to compete for 
residents and/or businesses who might locate in one of the districts (see, for example, Wilson, 
1999; Brueckner, 2000; Brueckner & Saavedra, 2001).  Maintaining a relatively low tax rate 
may benefit some of a district’s residents if it leads to higher property values and a higher 
local tax base, or if it helps to attract businesses and commerce that improve employment 
and private revenues.1  Second, there may be service competition, school districts increasing 
revenues in order to attract students to the local public schools or to gain popularity among 
households with children.  For example, increasing the number of advanced placement 
classes at the local high school to compete with a nearby high school might improve a 
district’s popularity among households with children in the region; school district officials 
might therefore decide to spend more on advanced placement classes, even if this leads to 
higher local property tax rates and does not lead to positive capitalization effects.  A third 
mechanism could occur regardless of whether student mobility is a concern—there may be 
yardstick competition (Besley & Case, 1995), whereby it is politically popular for districts to 
take similar actions as neighboring districts.  Given the difficulty of measuring public school 
quality, residents may simply feel that they need to spend money on local schools to “keep 
up with the Joneses” who live in a nearby district. 
 
In addition to these three mechanisms, there are two other mechanisms which could cause 
either a positive or a negative relationship between nearby districts’ expenditures.  There may 
be Tiebout (1956) re-sorting after one district, for some exogenous reason, changes its 
expenditure-tax bundle.  This change might induce relocation decisions of people or 
businesses into nearby districts, and this in turn could alter the aggregated social preferences 
in these nearby districts.  Tiebout re-sorting is distinct from tax competition, because it is 
unrelated to a district’s strategic concern about its tax base.  A district simply experiences a 
shift in aggregated social preferences as people relocate there to form better matches between 
their own preferences and the district’s expenditure-tax bundle.2  Using a computable general 
equilibrium model, Nechyba (2003) finds that changes in the amount of state aid targeted to 
one district influence the spending levels of nearby districts, as some households move across 
                                                 
1 Using a model in which local officials can extract rents by using public revenues for private benefits, Wilson 
and Gordon (2003) show that local officials’ concern about the size of local property tax bases can also decrease 
the share of local revenues devoted to socially wasteful spending. 
2 Given imperfect Tiebout sorting, there is within-district variation in citizens’ preferences for local public 
school expenditures.  Changes in expenditures could induce the relocation of citizens with relatively high or 
relatively low demand for local public school expenditures.  
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districts and some shift consumption between the private and public schooling sectors.3  
Finally, there may be externalities, whereby greater levels of services provided by neighboring 
districts create an incentive to either expand or cut back on a district’s own services.  For 
example, perhaps the presence of field hockey teams in neighboring school districts increases 
the benefit of adding a team.  Alternatively, perhaps the presence of a high revenue district 
nearby enables a district to maintain relatively low revenues and still attract businesses that 
employ adults with school-aged children.   
 
A few studies have empirically investigated the topic of fiscal spillovers at the state or county 
level (e.g., Case, Hines, & Rosen, 1993; Besley & Case, 1995; Figlio et. al. 1999; Baicker, 
2004; Baicker, 2005).  To identify spillovers, these studies argue that certain variables used in 
their analyses are only correlated with a government’s expenditures through their effects on 
neighboring governments’ expenditures.   
 
In their seminal study, Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993) identify the fiscal interdependence of 
state expenditures by assuming that demographic trends in a neighboring state are only 
correlated with a state’s own public expenditures via changes in the neighboring state’s 
expenditures.  Their study reveals that a state’s own expenditures are not positively influenced 
by the spending of contiguous states, those that are geographic neighbors.  (A more 
frequently cited result from their paper is evidence of fiscal interdependence among similar 
states that are not necessarily geographically proximate.)  Figlio et. al. (1999) and Baicker 
(2005) use policy variables to predict changes in states’ welfare expenditures and Medicaid 
costs respectively.  Defining “neighbors” as states with high rates of cross-migration, Figlio 
et. al. (1999) find that states respond to their neighbors’ welfare programs, especially when 
these programs become less generous.  Baicker (2005) finds that a 10% increase in state 
expenditures causes neighboring states to increase expenditures by between 3.7% and 8.8%.  
In another study, Baicker (2004) cleverly uses data concerning capital punishment trials to 
show that counties are likely to increase both expenditures and revenues when a neighboring 
county experiences an unanticipated increase in taxes. 
 
Additional studies have empirically investigated fiscal spillovers between municipalities or 
school districts.  Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) investigate fiscal spillovers between 70 
municipalities in the Boston area.  They empirically test for spatial endogeneity in their 
models, and these tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that their independent variables are 
exogenously determined.   Brueckner and Saavedra find evidence of positive spillovers 
between the municipalities, and they also find evidence that these spillovers disappeared after 
Proposition 2 ½ limited most Massachusetts’ cities ability to increase local property taxes.  
While there is not strong empirical evidence of spatial endogeneity in these Boston-area data, 
one would expect spatially-correlated, unobserved variables to become increasingly important 
as one expands the sample to include a greater number of localities spread across a wider 
geographic area.  Millimet & Rangasprad (2007) find evidence of fiscal spillovers between 
school districts in Illinois.  While their study thoughtfully addresses the difficulties of 
                                                 
3 In Nechyba’s (2003) analysis, a block grant targeted towards the lowest income district leads to increases in 
the equilibrium spending per pupil in both a medium-income district and a high-income district, whereas an 
equivalent-sized matching grant targeted towards the lowest income district leads to an increase in the 
equilibrium spending of the medium-income district and a decrease in the equilibrium spending of the high-
income district.  These changes are much larger than those implied by the estimates of average fiscal spillovers 
below, as grants lead to substantial capitalization effects in Nechbya’s analysis. 
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separating spillovers from unobserved trends, their empirical approaches might not fully 
address this problem.4  Babcock, Engberg, & Greenbaum (2005) find evidence of fiscal 
competition specifically related to public school teacher salaries in Pennsylvania districts.  
They find that a district’s salaries are highly influenced by previously established salaries in a 
comparison group of districts, defined by the contract negotiators.  This provides an example 
of one of the many mechanisms through which a school district’s operating revenues may 
respond to changes in other districts’ operating revenues, though, in the case of teacher 




| 3 | METHODOLOGY 
efine Rijt as the real operating revenue per pupil in district i located in state j during 
year t.  Suppose that changes in district i’s revenues per pupil are influenced by 
recent changes in the mean revenues among neighboring districts, as well as trends 
related to state finance policies and district i's demographics.  Define W1 and W2 as 
weighting matrices based on geographic proximity.  For example, when W1 is based on 
contiguous districts it is constructed so that multiplying W1 by a vector of values yields a 
vector with mean values among the contiguous neighbors of each district.   
 
The relationship between changes in a district’s per pupil revenues and changes in 
neighboring districts’ revenues may be expressed as:5 
Rijt - Rijt-5 =  β1W1(Rijt - Rijt-5)+ γjtβ2 + γjt Xijt-5β3jt   + eijt 
(1)      eijt = λW2 eijt  + εijt 
    with |β1|<1 and |λ|<1  and εijt~N(0,σ2), 
 
where γjt represents a vector of state-year indicator variables and γjt Xijt-5 represents these 
indicator variables interacted with lagged control variables capturing district i’s 
characteristics.  The major challenge for estimating Equation 1 is that revenue changes, Rijt - 
Rijt-5, are endogenous.  Unobserved shocks should have similar influences on a district’s own 
revenues and the revenues of neighboring districts.  The empirical analyses in this paper 
address the endogeneity of neighboring districts’ expenditure changes by using plausibly 
exogenous predictors of their revenue changes as instrumental variables.  The general form of 
the resulting model is:  
                                                 
4 Millimet and Rangaprasad (2007) use a variety of specifications.  One approach is an instrumental variables 
model similar in spirit to that of Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993).  In the local setting, these types of 
instrumental variables are likely to be endogenous due to residential mobility.  Another approach is to use 
lagged neighbor spending decisions, which is problematic if unobserved, common factors take different 
amounts of time to influence neighboring districts’ expenditures.   
5 This specification can be derived from a framework in which the level of revenues in district i during year t is a 
function of the levels of revenues in other districts and of district i’s current demographics, i.e., Rijt=f(W1Rijt, 
Xijt).  First-differencing these variables facilitates the use of the instrumental variables described below, which 
exploit exogenous variation in changes in revenues due to school finance reforms or other statewide trends.  
While the empirical models first-difference the revenues variables, changes in district i’s observed characteristics 
are endogenous; instead of first-differencing the demographic characteristics, the empirical models thus control 
for the state-by-year effects of detailed lagged demographic variables, which will be correlated with the 
exogenous component of districts’ demographic changes. 
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Rijt - Rijt-5 =  β1W1 ( )∧ −− 5ijtijt RR  + γjtβ2 + γjt Xijt-5β3jt   + eijt 
(2)      eijt = λW2 eijt  + εijt 
    with |β1|<1 and |λ|<1  and εijt~N(0,σ2), 
 
The control variables in the Xijt-5 vector used in the models below include detailed, lagged 
demographic characteristics:  state-year specific quartile spline terms for mean house value 
and for median income of residents, as well as variables measuring population density, the 
fraction of the district’s population composed of school-aged children (ages 5-17), and the 
fraction of the district’s population composed of people who are at least 65 years old.  Given 
that the demographic effects are allowed to vary by state and by year, these variables will pick 
up the impact of state-specific factors and policies.  The analyses consist of two general 
instrumental variable strategies, an all-neighbor instrumental variable and an out-of-state 
neighbor instrumental variable.   
 
3.1 All-Neighbor IV 
 
The all-neighbor instrumental variable strategy assumes that the impact of any spatially-
correlated unobserved variable dies out beyond a certain distance.  Districts within the same 
state during the same year are compared based on five lagged characteristics: operating 
revenues per pupil, mean income, median house value, population density, and the fraction 
of the population composed of school-aged children (ages 5 to 17).6  I identify which four 
districts in the same state as district X and located at least some minimum distance from 
district X are most similar to district X based on these lagged characteristics.7  The average 
actual change in revenues among these four comparison districts is used as an instrumental 
variable for the change in district X’s revenues.  For the main analyses, I use a minimum 
distance of 100 miles for the comparison districts.  Using a shorter minimum distance would 
inflate estimates to the point where they are almost as large as ordinary least squares 
estimates, ostensibly because spatially-correlated, unobserved factors bias the results, but 
using a further minimum distance would not reduce the estimates by substantial or 







                                                 
6 Observations for 1977, 1982, and 1987 are matched based on only four characteristics because house value 
information is not available from the 1970 Census.   
7 To determine similarity, I compute the Z-score for each of these five variables among observations in the same 
state and year, and then compute an index of dissimilarity equal to the sum of the squared differences between 
district X’s Z-score and the Z-score of the comparison district.  
8 Results using shorter distance cutoffs support the idea that standard instrumental variables models, with 
predicted values that are partially based on the behavior of geographically proximate districts, are biased 
upwards.  Using a minimum distance of 50 miles for this paper’s main all-neighbor IV model, (row 4 of Table 
2), would produce an estimate of fiscal spillovers of .322, nearly as large as the corresponding ordinary least 
squares estimate of .366.  In contrast, using a minimum distance of 150 miles for this paper’s main all-neighbor 
IV model yields an estimate of fiscal spillovers of .212, which is not statistically different from the .233 estimate 
in the main analyses which use a minimum distance of 100 miles. 
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3.2 Out-of-State Neighbor IV 
 
3.2.1 Baseline Out-of-State Neighbor IV Specification 
 
The out-of-state neighbor instrumental variables models identify fiscal spillovers based on 
instruments that are even more likely to be exogenous, because their validity lies only on the 
assumption that unobserved shocks do not spread more than 100 miles across state borders.  
Spillovers are identified based only on the predicted values for neighboring districts in other 
states.  Furthermore, these out-of-state neighbors’ predicted values are based on matches with 
districts that are not only located at least 100 miles away but are also at least 100 miles away 
from the relevant state border.9  The identification thus comes from trends in the 
neighboring state among districts that are similar to the border districts but are located far 
away from a district’s own state.  
 
For the N school districts in the sample, define S as an N×N matrix with element Sij equal to 
one if districts i and j are in the same state and equal to zero otherwise.  Define A as an N×N 
matrix of ones.  To identify districts’ responses to their mean neighbors’ change solely from 
responses to out-of-state neighbors, one may use S to partition the mean change in 
neighbors’ revenues on the right hand side of equation 2, using instrumented values for out-
of-state neighbors’ changes and state-by-year means for in-state neighbors’ changes:  
  Rijt - Rijt-5 =  β1W1(A-S) ( )∧ −− 5ijtijt RR  + (β1W1S + β2) γjt  + γjt Xijt-5β3jt   + eijt 
(3)      eijt = λW2 eijt  + εijt 
    with |β1|<1 and |λ|<1 and εijt~N(0,σ2), 
 
While the model continues to include all districts in the continental United States, the 
estimates of fiscal spillovers are identified from β1 on the first right-hand-side term, the 
response to predicted changes in out-of-state neighbors’ revenues.  This estimate of spillovers 
is based on districts’ responses to predicted changes in the mean revenues of their neighbors 
based on the predicted changes in the revenues of districts’ out-of-state neighbors.  The next 
three subsections describe additional out-of-state IV specifications which provide robustness 
checks for the validity of the instrument and the applicability of the estimates to spillovers 
between in-state districts. 
 
3.2.2 Out-of-State Neighbors in States with Major, Unique Finance Reforms 
 
There is prior empirical evidence that one state’s spending does not influence the spending of 
contiguous states (Case, Hines, & Rosen, 1993), but if districts in contiguous states have 
similar expenditure trends, then even the out-of-state neighbor IV might be endogenous.  In 
the extreme case, contiguous states undergo identical finance trends and the estimates from 
equation 3 face the same potential pitfalls as estimates from equation 2.  To examine the 
importance of this issue, I estimate additional models which identify fiscal spillovers solely 
from cases in which one state has a significant finance reform while the neighboring state 
does not have a similar change.  One state’s education finance reform has differential effects 
                                                 
9 As with the all-neighbor IV models, 100 miles appears to be a sufficiently far cutoff for eliminating spatial 
endogeneity.  For the main out-of-state IV model, using a 150 mile cutoff would produce an estimate of .181 
(.043 standard error); this estimate is fairly close to and not statistically different from .219, the corresponding 
out-of-state IV estimate in row 4 of Table 2 based on a cutoff of 100 miles. 
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on its own border districts, and the lack of a similar policy within the neighboring state 
allows for a relatively clean case of identifying the impact on various border districts in the 
neighboring state.  The exact timing of responses to official state school finance reforms is 
difficult to predict, and unofficial policy reforms sometimes have significant effects as states 
adjust their school finance formulas and tax policies.  Therefore, I allow the data to reveal the 
timing of states’ substantial education finance changes.  I divide each state’s districts into 
three groups based on income and examine whether the mean change in revenues was large 
for any of these groups.  I define a large change as a group having a mean increase of more 
than $2,000 per pupil or a mean decrease of more than $1,000 per pupil, (in year 2000 
dollars), changes equivalent to the 72nd  or 22nd percentile in the distribution of individual 
district-level revenue changes.  This definition of major finance changes matches up well 
with lists of court-ordered and state legislature-initiated school finance equalization programs 
compiled by Downes and Shah (2006) and Corcoran and Evans (forthcoming): except for 
Montana and South Dakota, all states with court-ordered or state legislative reforms 
experienced this type of major finance change at least once during the ten years following 
these reforms.10  Next, I identify fiscal spillovers by using the instrumental variable only in 
cases in which a district has out-of-state neighbors in a state with large changes among one of 
the income groups and the district’s own state did not experience a “similar change” for its 
corresponding income group.  I define a “similar change” as a change that is at least 50% as 
large as the other state’s change and in the same direction.  Identifying spillovers from major, 
unique changes in states’ finances reduces the possibility of a biased estimate due to states 
engaging in similar fiscal policies, though it decreases the number of observations used to 
identify spillovers by more than 82%.   
 
3.2.3 Out-of-State Neighbors with High Interstate Residential Mobility  
 
There are theoretical reasons why one might suspect responses to out-of-state neighboring 
districts to differ from responses to in-state neighboring districts.  Tax-payers, students, and 
school employees may tend to be less mobile across inter-state borders than across within-
state borders.  Fiscal spillovers between out-of-state neighbors may differ depending on 
whether residential mobility across state borders is limited due to state-level policies or other 
factors.  To investigate this issue, I re-estimate the out-of-state neighbor IV models above 
restricting the source of identification to responses among border districts with rates of inter-
state residential mobility above the median rate for border districts. 
 
 
                                                 
10  South Dakota and Montana experienced major finance changes preceding state legislation in 1986 and a 
court-ordered reform in 1989 respectively, but neither state experienced major finance changes afterwards.  The 
states that experienced major finance changes due to tax reforms or other changes that were not considered 
formal school finance equalization reforms, (i.e., not listed by Downes & Shah, 2006 or Corcoran & Evans, 
forthcoming), were Alabama (major changes over each of the 5 year periods spanning 1982-92), Delaware 
(1982-1992 and 1997-2002), Indiana (1982-1987), Michigan (1982-1997), Mississippi (1982-1992), 
Nebraska (1977-1992), North Carolina (1977-1992), North Dakota (1977-1982), Oregon (1977-1992), and 
Pennsylvania (1977-1992).  Removing these unofficial cases of major finance changes would increase the 
standard error of the fiscal spillover estimates but would barely alter the point estimates.  For example, Table 3 
below reveals that when neighbors are defined as districts located within a thirty mile radius, the out-of-state IV 
estimate using unique, major finance changes equals .271 (.062 standard error).  The corresponding point 
estimate equals .273 (.158 standard error) if the identification is further restricted to responses occurring within 
ten years after a court-ordered or legislature-initiated statewide school finance equalization reform. 
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3.2.4 Out-of-State Neighbor IV Controlling for Border-by-Year Fixed Effects 
 
The out-of-state neighbor IV estimates identify spillovers by comparing a border district’s 
revenue growth to the revenue growth of similar districts in the same state which did not 
have any out-of-state neighbors, had out-of-state neighbors with different characteristics, or 
had out-of-state neighbors located in a different state.  Some of this identification is thus 
related to variation in revenue changes across geographic regions within the same state.  The 
estimate of spillovers may be biased if, controlling for initial characteristics, within-state 
variation in revenue changes are related to unobserved characteristics.  For example, suppose 
that districts in eastern Pennsylvania experienced high revenue growth compared to 
observationally similar districts in western Pennsylvania, at a time when New Jersey districts 
increased their revenues far more than Ohio districts increased their revenues.  Differences in 
revenue growth between districts in eastern versus western Pennsylvania may be due to 
differences in their neighbors’ behavior, coincidental differences in omitted variables across 
the two regions of Pennsylvania, or some combination of both.  If omitted variables across 
two regions of the same state are systematically correlated with the fiscal behavior of the 
neighboring states, then the previous out-of-state IV estimates of spillovers may be biased.  
To address this issue, I repeat all of the out-of-state neighbor IV analyses with the addition of 
controls for border-year fixed effects.  For each five year interval, these border-year fixed 
effects absorb the average revenue change for districts located in the same state with at least 
one neighboring district in a specific, other state.  Continuing the example above, this model 
would control for the average difference during each time period between the changes in 
revenues in Pennsylvania districts bordering Ohio and the changes in revenues in 
Pennsylvania districts bordering New Jersey.  The estimates of spillovers are thus identified 
from the behavior of districts along the same side of the same state border with out-of-state 
neighbors that possess different initial characteristics.   
 
 
| 4 | DATA 
he analyses use geographic data for every school district in the United States based on 
the Census TIGER files, which provide centroid coordinates for the districts and 
allow the researcher to identify which districts share a border.  I combine these data 
with district-level financial panel data available in five year intervals from 1972 to 2002.  The 
financial data for (spring of) 1992, 1997, and 2002 come from the School District Finance 
Survey (F-33 files), while earlier years come from the Census of Government Files.   
 
The dependent variable in this paper’s main analyses equals changes in a district’s real 
operating revenue per pupil.  I examine revenues rather than expenditures because revenue 
information is available for a longer span of years.  Observations with suspicious levels of 
revenues per pupil are removed from the data prior to analysis.11  I combine these financial 
                                                 
11 Less than 1% of all observations in the raw data are dropped due to questionable revenue per pupil values.  In 
particular, I drop observations with real operating revenues per pupil below $400 or above $22,000, (measured 
in year 2002 $).  I also drop observations that would suggest a more than $10,000 change in revenue per pupil 
in one five-year period followed by a level of revenue per pupil five years later that is within $4000 of the 
original level from ten years prior.  It is highly unlikely that any district would actually undergo such a large, 
temporary change in revenue per pupil.   
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data with U.S. Census demographic data aggregated to the school district level for 1970, 
1980, and 1990. 
 
Some analyses below also include self-collected data concerning variation in the local political 
processes for determining school district expenditure levels.  Political institutions could 
influence the magnitude or speed of districts’ responses to their neighbors’ actions.  I 
obtained information concerning local democratic institutions from 1970 to 2002, using 
surveys of state finance experts, reviews of school finance documents (e.g., U.S. Department 
of Education, 2001), data from Saiz’s (2005) New England municipality interviews with 
local school officials, and referenda frequency information for 1970-1972 from Hamilton 
and Cohen (1974).12  In the 48 continental states, about 37% of all districts currently 
determine expenditure levels exclusively through local citizens voting directly, 55% 
determine their expenditure levels through locally elected representatives, and citizens in the 
remaining 8% of districts do not have much discretion over local public school operating 
expenditure levels.  Analyzing the magnitude and speed of fiscal responses in various local 
democratic systems may thus provide insights into the political mechanisms by which fiscal 
spillovers occur.  Except where noted, the analyses below exclude districts lacking local 
discretion over local public school operating expenditure levels, because these districts would 
not have the capacity to engage in fiscal competition.13   
 
A small share of localities experienced school district re-organizations during the sample 
period, such as mergers between districts or unifications of elementary-level districts with 
secondary-level districts.  While panel studies of education finance usually ignore these 
mergers or drop all observations for districts which ever re-organized, it may be important to 
verify that the ensuing sample selection does not have a large effect on the empirical results.  
The analyses below incorporate historical data concerning any type of school district re-
organization.  The main analyses include a full set of observations for districts that merged by 
combining data from the participating districts for observations predating the merger.  These 
                                                 
12 We first surveyed the contributors to "Public School Finance Programs of the U.S. and Canada: 1998-99” 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2001) from each state regarding the form of local democracy in that state.  If 
necessary, we also contacted state education officials who were members of the American Education Finance 
Association.  While most of the survey responses alluded only to current practices, the information reported in 
Hamilton and Cohen (1974) allowed us to detect state-level changes in these policies over time.  These changes 
typically coincided with state education finance equalization reforms.  Most states with inter-district variation 
in the form of local democracy are New England states where the school districts coincide with towns and each 
district’s form of democracy matches the municipal form of democracy coded by Saiz (2005).  One exception is 
New Hampshire, which required us to survey each district individually.  Anecdotal evidence for districts in 
places with intra-state variation suggests that these districts tend to retain the same form of democracy over 
time, but it is possible that district-level longitudinal changes are a source of measurement error in these data.  
13 The data used for the main analyses thus exclude observations for districts in California from 1977 on, 
Michigan from 1997 on, Nevada from 1977 on, New Mexico from 1977 on, Oregon for 1997, and Wyoming 
for 2002.  California is classified as a no-local-control state, because in 1976 the Serrano decision took away 
virtually all local control of operating expenditure levels.  However, California districts have had the option of 
using a parcel tax to fund some local public school operating expenditures.  During the sample period, this 
parcel tax required approval from two-thirds of district voters and its use was mostly limited to relatively 
wealthy districts in the northern part of the state.  I exclude all California districts from the main analyses 
because they had relatively little local discretion, but I also account for California’s parcel tax option in 
additional analyses that focus on districts lacking any local discretion. 
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analyses also control for whether a district re-organized and whether any of a district’s 
neighbors re-organized.14   
 
| 5 | RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
able 1 displays how district operating revenues per pupil have changed between 1972 
and 2002.  Each five year interval was associated with a rise in real mean district 
revenue per pupil, except for the period between 1972 and 1977 when large growth 
in student populations outpaced revenue growth.  Mean revenues per pupil increased rapidly 
from the late 1970’s through the mid 1980’s, as population growth slowed and many states 
enacted school finance reforms.  Changes in a district’s own revenues per pupil are highly 
correlated with changes in the mean neighboring districts’ revenues per pupil.  This 
correlation was particularly high for in-state neighbors during the 1980’s, when many states 
enacted school finance equalization policies.  The correlation is much higher for in-state 
neighboring districts than for out-of-state neighboring districts, which is consistent both 
with common underlying trends for in-state neighbors and with districts being more 
responsive to changes among their in-state neighbors.    
 
The Appendix displays the means and standard deviations of descriptive variables used to 
formulate some of the independent variables in the regressions below.  Districts with at least 
one out-of-state neighbor have a higher average population density than other districts, and 
they also tend to have wealthier residents and slightly higher revenues per pupil than other 
districts.  These differences, which are statistically significant at the .001 level, imply that it 
may be important to compare the all-neighbor and out-of-state neighbor instrumental 
variable specifications’ estimates specifically among districts with certain characteristics, such 
as districts that are relatively wealthy or are located in metropolitan areas. 
 
5.2 Power of the Instrumental Variables 
 
Both the out-of-state neighbor IV and all-neighbor IV are powerful predictors of actual 
mean revenue changes.  When actual mean neighbor revenue changes are regressed on the 
all-neighbor instrument controlling for state-by-year fixed effects, the estimated slope equals 
.905 with a standard error of .004, and the instrument explains 42% of the within-state-year 
variation in mean neighbor revenue changes.15  The high power of this instrument is partly 
                                                 
14 The models include four independent variables related to re-organizations: an indictor for whether the district 
re-organized during that time period, an indicator for whether any of the district’s neighbor’s re-organized 
during that time period, an indicator for whether the number of neighbors increased from the prior period, and 
an indicator for whether the number of neighbors decreased from the prior period.  Additional analyses, not 
shown here, test the sensitivity of this specification by instead using a balanced panel containing districts that 
never underwent any re-organization.  Estimates of fiscal competition using this balanced panel are slightly 
larger than the estimates shown in this paper, with differences of less than 5 cents (.05) for the main 
specifications below.  
15 These estimates are based on defining neighbors as districts with centroid coordinates that are within a 30 
mile radius of each other.  Defining neighbors as districts within a twenty mile radius, the estimated coefficient 
equals .930 with a .004 standard error and explains 40% of the within-state-by-year variation in bordering 
T 
 11
due to states frequently changing their education finance formulas, with similar 
consequences for similar districts within the same state.  For the out-of-state neighbor IV, 
when actual mean revenue changes among out-of-state neighboring districts are regressed on 
their instrumented values controlling for state-by-year fixed effects, the estimated coefficient 
equals .897 with a .006 standard error and the instrumental variable explains 46% of the 
within-state-by-year variation in mean revenue changes of districts’ out-of-state neighbors.16   
 
5.3 Main Results 
 
Table 2 reveals estimates of fiscal spillovers given various definitions of neighbors and various 
methodologies.  Each estimate represents the impact on a district’s own revenues per pupil if 
the mean neighboring district revenues per pupil increases by one dollar, measured in year 
2000 dollars. As discussed previously, these regressions also control for state-year fixed 
effects, as well as state-year-specific effects of districts’ lagged demographic variables.  From 
left to right, each column of Table 2 displays estimates for models which are increasingly 
likely to only reflect responses to exogenous changes in neighbors’ behavior.  The first 
column displays estimates from ordinary least squares regressions.  The second column 
displays estimates from the IV model that uses predicted changes for both in-state and out-
of-state neighbors, the third column displays estimates from the IV model that only uses 
predicted changes for out-of-state neighbors, and the fourth column displays estimates from 
the IV model that only uses predicted changes for out-of-state neighbors in states with 
major, unique school finance changes.  The samples sizes vary slightly between the rows of 
Table 2 as the definition of neighboring districts changes, because districts must have at least 
one neighbor with a valid instrumented value in order to be included in the regression.  The 
sample sizes are the same across each row, because districts need not have an out-of-state 
neighbor to be included in the out-of-state neighbor IV regressions.   
 
The point estimates in Row 1 of Table 2 suggest that a one dollar increase in the mean 
operating revenues per pupil of contiguous districts leads to between an 7.3 cent and 26.8 
cent increase in a district’s own operating revenues per pupil, depending on which 
instrumental variables specification is used.  As expected, the OLS estimates (first column) 
are greater than the corresponding instrumental variable estimates.  The out-of-state 
neighbor instrumental variables model provides conservative point estimates for overall 
spillovers, suggesting that districts respond by at least 7.3 cents per pupil for a $1 change in 
mean neighbors’ per pupil revenues.  This lower bound point estimate is statistically 
significant at the .10 level, suggesting that one can be somewhat confident that districts 
actually respond to changes in their contiguous neighbors’ finances.  The third instrumental 
variable specification, which identifies competition solely from unique finance changes in 
neighboring states, produces an even larger estimate of 14.5 cents, though this estimate is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
districts’ revenue changes.  Defining neighbors as contiguous districts, the estimated coefficient equals .998 
with a .004 standard error and explains 43% of the within-state-by-year variation in bordering districts’ revenue 
changes.   
16 These estimates are based on defining neighbors as districts with centroid coordinates that are within a 30 
mile radius of each other.  Defining neighbors as districts within a twenty mile radius, the estimated coefficient 
equals .920 with a .008 standard error and explains 47% of the within-state-by-year variation in bordering 
districts’ revenue changes.  Defining neighbors as contiguous districts, the estimated coefficient equals .903 
with a .009 standard error and explains 44% of the variation in bordering districts’ revenue changes.   
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School district revenues not only respond to revenue changes among contiguous school 
districts, but they have greater responses to changes among other nearby districts.  Rows 2 
and 3 of Table 2 respectively display estimates of spillovers among districts located within a 
twenty mile radius and districts located within a twenty mile radius that have similar median 
household incomes.17  A neighboring district has a similar median income if its median 
income is within 20% of the district’s own median income.18  Estimates of spillovers are 
between 8 and 22 cents per one dollar change in the mean revenues of districts located 
within twenty miles, while estimates are between about 14 and 21 cents for districts located 
within twenty miles and possessing similar median incomes.   
 
Expanding the definition of neighbors to districts within thirty miles, the all-neighbor IV 
estimates of spillovers are slightly larger and the out-of-state-neighbor IV point estimates of 
spillovers converge on these all-neighbor IV estimates.  Rows 4 and 5 reveal that the point 
estimates of spillovers are between about 22 and 27 cents when neighbors are defined as 
districts within thirty miles and between about 17 and 27 cents when neighbors are defined 
as districts within thirty miles with similar median household incomes.  All of these estimates 
are statistically significant at the .001 level, so one can be very confident of a positive fiscal 
response to the mean per pupil revenues of districts within thirty miles.  These estimates 
remain statistically significant if one adjusts the standard errors for spatial and serial 
autocorrelation.19  Estimates of spillovers do not increase if the definition of neighbors is 
expanded to include districts beyond thirty miles, nor do they increase if one examines ten 
year intervals rather than five year intervals.  The remaining analyses presented in this paper 
define neighboring districts as those within a thirty mile radius, because estimates of 
spillovers are large and similar across the various instrumental variable specifications in row 4 
of Table 2.   
 
Table 3 displays estimates of spillovers based on the additional out-of-state neighbor IV 
specifications described in the previous section.  The first two columns of Table 3 are 
analogous to the estimates in columns 3 and 4 of row 4 of Table 2.  For the most inclusive 
group of out-of-state neighbors, spillovers decrease from about 23 cents to about 14 cents 
when border-year fixed effects are included.  Controlling for border-year fixed effects does 
not substantially change the estimates based on out-of-state neighbors in states with major, 
unique finance changes, which is sensible given that there are very few cases in which a state 
borders two different states that simultaneously undergo substantial finance changes. 
 
To investigate the importance of the permeability across a state border, I re-estimate the out-
of-state IV analysis identifying fiscal spillovers solely from the 50% of out-of-state 
                                                 
17 Throughout this paper, distances between districts are based on distances between their centroid coordinates.  
Minimum distances between districts’ borders are not readily available in these data. 
18 Just over half of all out-of-state districts within a twenty or thirty mile radius meet this income criterion.  
19 The standard errors reported in the tables do not account for potential spatial autocorrelation and serial 
autocorrelation.  Adjusting for autocorrelation increases the standard errors for the 30 mile radius models (row 
4 of Table 2) from .01 to .04 for the all-neighbor IV model and from .04 to .05 for the out-of-state neighbors 
IV model.   These adjusted standard errors were found using the GMM estimation proposed by Conley (1999), 
finding weighted averages of spatial autocovariance terms with weights set to zero if districts are located more 
than 50 miles away from each other or their observations are more than one time period (5 years) apart.  I am 
grateful to Tim Conley for providing the Matlab program which I adapted for these estimations.  Due to the 
lengthy computational time required, spatially adjusted standard errors were not computed for the other 
models. 
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neighboring school districts with the highest rates of inter-state residential mobility.20  
Column 3 of Table 3 displays the estimates for this model, with or without border-year fixed 
effects.  Districts with relatively high rates of inter-state mobility have a greater fiscal 
response to their out-of-state neighbors, especially if the model does not control for border-
year fixed effects.  The estimate controlling for border-year fixed effects is arguably more 
informative, because the potential regional bias described earlier might be particularly strong 
when residents in multiple regions of a state are highly mobile across different state lines.  To 
the extent that inter-state neighbors across relatively permeable state borders are similar to 
typical neighboring districts, this estimate suggests the typical level of fiscal spillovers may be 
about 20 cents per a $1 change in the mean neighbors’ revenues; this is fairly close to the all-
neighbor IV point estimate of 23 cents.  
 
5.4 Falsification Test 
 
Some U.S. school districts lack local discretion over operating revenues, because the state 
decides their level of revenues for them.  These districts provide a nice falsification test for 
the instrumental variables models—spillovers should be absent for districts lacking local 
discretion, because any co-movements in revenues per pupil among neighbors are not due to 
districts’ own fiscal responses.  For this falsification test, I re-estimate the models in row 4 of 
Table 2 using observations from districts lacking control.  This sample includes observations 
from Nevada, New Mexico, and some Californian districts.21  California removed much local 
control from its districts after the Serrano decision in 1976, but California’s districts have 
also had a parcel tax option for funding local public school operating expenditures.  Due to 
the availability of this parcel tax option, observations from half of all California districts are 
excluded from the “no local control” sample, specifically districts whose median household 
income in 1980 was above the median Californian district.  These Californian districts had a 
moderate probability of attempting to adopt a parcel tax to fund local school operating 
expenditures, while this probability was extremely low for all other Californian districts.22   
 
As expected, the out-of-state neighbor IV estimates suggest that districts unable to locally 
determine their budgets do not respond positively to changes in neighboring districts’ 
revenues.  The estimates of spillovers for these districts are -.080 cents (standard error of .165 
                                                 
20 Estimates suggest that more than 6.4% of the residents living in these districts in the year 2000 had lived in a 
different state five years earlier.  These estimates are available from the 2000 Census Public Use Micro-Sample 
and unavailable for earlier years, and these mobility rates do not identify the particular states where residents 
formerly resided.  The high mobility group excludes a handful of districts in which more than 50% of residents 
lived in a different city during the prior 5 years, because inter-state mobility in these districts was generally due 
to local colleges or military bases rather than typical residential relocation decisions.  While high interstate 
mobility between 1995 and 2000 could possibly be endogenous with respect to fiscal changes during the 
1990’s, the results remain similar if one focuses on fiscal spillovers between these districts prior to the 1990’s.   
 
21 Observations are excluded if the form of local democracy changed within the past ten years or the next five 
years, because such a change could lead to residential movement that would influence the estimates. 
22 According to EdSource (2007), between 1983 and 2006, “210 school districts out of nearly 1,000” attempted 
to pass this type of parcel tax, and “about 90% of the elections were held in districts that were below the state 
average of 49% low-income students.”  Given that a non-trivial portion of the wealthier Californian districts 
exercised local discretion, including them in the “no-local-control” group would increase the estimates of fiscal 
spillovers among “no-local-control” districts from -.080 to -.075 for the out-of-state neighbor IV model, from -
.091 to -.052 for the out-of-state neighbor IV model with border-year fixed effects, and from .084 to .197 for 
the all-neighbor IV model. 
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cents) for the out-of-state neighbor IV model and -.091 cents (standard error of .200 cents) 
for the out-of-state neighbor IV model controlling for border-year fixed effects.  While the 
point estimates for these districts are negative, there are large standard errors due to the small 
sample size for this group and the estimates are statistically insignificant. 
 
For the all-neighbor IV model, the estimate of fiscal spillovers is positive for districts lacking 
local control, but is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  The estimated 
coefficient equals .084 cents with a .065 cent standard error and a p-value of .200.   
 
5.5 Discussion of Results and Exploration of Heterogeneous Effects 
 
The results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that fiscal spillovers between districts are, on average, in 
the neighborhood of 20 cents per a $1 change in mean neighbors’ revenues, where the 
relevant set of neighbors is districts located within a thirty mile radius.  The instrumental 
variables estimates are considerably smaller than the ordinary least squares estimate of about 
38 cents.  The most conservative instrumental variables estimate is the 14.2 cent response 
from the out-of-state neighbor IV model that controls for border-year fixed effects.  It is 
reassuring that the out-of-state IV estimates remain similar when identification is based only 
on states with unique school finance reforms, and it is also reassuring that these models do 
not suggest positive spillovers among districts that lack local discretion over operating 
revenues.   
 
The all-neighbor IV model produces slightly larger estimates than the out-of-state IV 
neighbor model, unless the out-of-state IV model focuses on districts with relatively high 
inter-state residential mobility.  This begs the question: Are the slightly greater estimates for 
the all-neighbor IV model due to a small bias or due to heterogeneity in spillovers that causes 
in-state spillovers to differ from inter-state spillovers?  There might be a small upward bias in 
the all-neighbor IV model, given that this model produced a positive coefficient of .084 cents 
for the no-local-control sample of districts.  On the other hand, this .084 cent estimate was 
not statistically significant, its magnitude would not necessarily apply to districts in other 
states, and there may be legitimate reasons why local fiscal spillovers are weaker across state 
borders.   
 
Additional analyses help reveal which mechanisms are most responsible for fiscal spillovers 
and provide evidence supporting legitimate explanations for differences between within-state 
and between-state spillovers.  The remainder of this section describes heterogeneity in fiscal 
spillovers along several dimensions: the form of local democracy used to determine local 
school revenues, whether the district is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area, whether 
the district was initially wealthier than its neighbors, and whether the district was initially 
outspending its neighbors.  The results suggest that differences between the fiscal spillover 
estimates across the instrumental variable specifications stem from districts that are initially 
wealthier than all of their neighbors.  These regionally wealthy districts engage in fiscal 
competition with their in-state neighbors but not with their out-of-state neighbors.  
 
Table 4 displays the results of separate regressions which add an indicator for districts’ initial 
status compared to their neighbors, as well as an interaction term between this indicator and 
the predicted change in neighboring districts’ revenues.  Panels (i) and (ii) of Table 4 reveal 
that, for the out-of-state neighbor IV models, spillovers are strongest when a district’s initial 
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median household income exceeds the mean of its neighbors but does not exceed the median 
household income of every neighbor.  In fact, fiscal spillovers are very small and statistically 
insignificant in these models if a district’s median household income already exceeds that of 
all of its neighbors.  In contrast, fiscal spillovers in the all-neighbor IV model are similar 
regardless of districts’ initial income positions.  This result might be due to state policy 
differences in terms of the progressiveness of taxation and school expenditures across state 
lines; relatively wealthy households residing near state borders likely choose to reside in the 
state with fewer redistributive policies, and cross-state differences in progressiveness 
overshadow marginal changes in the tax-expenditure bundles of nearby, out-of-state districts.  
Only the districts that are the wealthiest in their region appear to be immune to the behavior 
of their out-of-state neighbors—for all other districts, fiscal spillovers are very similar across 
the all neighbor IV model and out-of-state neighbor IV models. 
 
Additional analyses suggest that local fiscal spillovers are asymmetric and that the prior 
estimates may be very slightly biased downwards due to reversion to the mean.  Panel (iii) of 
Table 4 reveals that districts starting with relatively low revenues increase their revenues by 
more than $1,000 per pupil, on average, compared to other districts.  This difference in 
intercepts suggests that there is substantial mean reversion in terms of district revenues 
within local regions.  While districts with relatively high revenues per pupil have a smaller 
intercept due to this mean reversion, the slope associated with responses to changes in 
neighbors’ revenues is much larger for these relatively high spending districts.  For the model 
using the out-of-state neighbor instrumental variable controlling for border-year fixed effects, 
districts initially possessing greater per pupil revenues than their neighbors raise an additional 
37.6 cents per pupil for a one dollar increase in the average per pupil revenues of their 
neighbors; in contrast, districts initially possessing lower per pupil revenues than their 
neighbors respond to their neighbor’ revenues changes with a slope of 12.6 cents per pupil.  
For the all-neighbor IV model, these estimated slopes equal 28.9 cents and 18.3 cents 
respectively.  Local spillovers are less often a matter of “keeping up with the Joneses” than a 
matter of “staying ahead of the Joneses.”   
 
Metropolitan area status provides another interesting source of heterogeneity in the size of 
spillovers.  I classify districts as located inside an MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) based 
on their classification in the 2000 Census.  One might expect densely populated 
metropolitan areas to engage in greater degrees of fiscal competition, because tax rates and 
public school popularity may be more readily capitalized into house prices in these areas and 
because residents may be relatively well informed of the behavior of surrounding districts.  
Panel (iv) of Table 4 confirms that responses to the revenue changes of out-of-state neighbors 
are in fact strongest among districts located in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA’s).  Fiscal 
spillovers across state borders are more than 40% greater in MSA’s than in non-MSA’s.  
More surprisingly, fiscal spillovers in the all-neighbor IV model are strongest outside of 
MSA’s, with a 23.8 cent response for non-MSA districts versus a 12.9 cent response for 
districts in MSA’s.   
 
Additional empirical analyses suggest these differences are related to residential mobility.  
Changes in the tax-expenditure bundle offered by one district can cause some of its residents 
to move to other, nearby districts, and can marginally influence the location decisions of 
people moving to the area.  The additional analyses empirically test for the impact of changes 
in neighboring districts’ revenues on the residential composition of a district; they are similar 
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to the main analyses, except the dependent variable is changed to the median household 
income in the school district.23  Given that there will be multiple, simultaneous changes 
occurring in districts’ expenditures and demographics, these analyses simply reveal reduced-
form relationships associated with districts moving from one equilibrium to another.  The 
results suggest that an increase in the revenues of in-state, neighboring districts is associated 
with a decrease in a district’s own median household income if and only if the district is 
located in a metropolitan area.  In particular, the all-neighbor IV model suggests that a 
$1000 increase in mean revenues of neighboring districts leads to an $86 decrease in a 
metropolitan districts’ own household income but a $58 increase in a non-metropolitan 
districts’ own household income, a difference of $144 that is statistically significant at the .01 
level.  Rising school revenues in nearby metropolitan area districts likely lure away relatively 
wealthy households, thus lowering the median income of a district’s own residents in spite of 
the district’s positive fiscal response to its neighbors.  Given that local public education 
spending is a normal good, this change in residential composition attenuates the district’s 
positive fiscal response.  Changes in household income might be symptomatic of more 
general changes whereby, particularly in metropolitan areas, an increase in neighboring 
districts’ revenues leads to an influx of residents with a relatively low demand for public 
school services.24     
 
The magnitude of fiscal spillovers is also influenced by the type of political institution used 
to make local school tax revenue decisions.  Table 5 displays regression results for models 
dividing the sample based on the form of local democracy.  The sample is divided based on 
the three categories described in Section 4: (1) districts without any local discretion, (2) 
districts using representative democracy, and (3) districts exclusively using direct democracy.  
As discussed earlier, the estimates of fiscal spillovers are statistically insignificant and 
relatively small for districts without any local discretion.  The estimates of fiscal spillovers are 
slightly larger for districts using direct democracy than for districts using representative 
democracy.  For either of these forms of local democracy, the in-state IV estimates are only 
slightly larger than the out-of-state IV estimates.  Elected school officials, (e.g., 
superintendents, school board members, etc.) are often agenda-setters in districts with direct 
democracy, choosing which tax rates or spending levels to submit for voter approval.  The 
similarity of the size of fiscal spillovers across the two forms of democracy suggests that these 
                                                 
23 Demographic variables are only available at ten year intervals corresponding with Census years.  Therefore, 
instead of using five year intervals as in the previous analyses, these models regress median household income 
on the predicted changes in neighboring districts’ operating revenues per pupil over the prior ten years.  These 
models use the same set of control variables as in the previous analyses, so the control variables include lagged 
median household income and other lagged demographic characteristics.  A limitation of these analyses is that 
the fiscal and demographic data are not available in precisely the same year, so the Census year median 
household income variable (i.e., 1980, 1990, and 2000) is actually regressed on predicted ten year changes in 
neighboring district revenues that slightly overlap these Census years (i.e., 1972 to 1982, 1982 to 1992, and 
1992 to 2002).  These analyses thus fail to capture the impact of any unexpected statewide revenue change 
occurring in the two years immediately following each Census.   
 
24 While the differential impact on median household income can partially explain why metropolitan districts 
have smaller net fiscal spillovers, this income differential alone is not large enough to explain the entire .109 
difference in the slopes of fiscal spillovers between metropolitan and non-metropolitan districts— the elasticity 
of local school operating revenues with respect to median household income would have to be as high as 4 in 
order to explain this entire difference.   
 17
officials may face similar objectives and constraints regardless of whether the district uses 
direct or representative voting to determine operating revenues. 
 
Some districts with local control might actually be constrained in terms of their local 
expenditure decisions, because many states limit school district revenues or expenditures.  
Brueckner & Saavedra (2001), for example, find that tax competition between Boston-area 
municipalities disappeared after the arrival of Massachusetts’ Proposition 2 ½.  To explore 
this issue in the school district context, I also tested for heterogeneous levels of fiscal 
spillovers based on the timing of states’ adoption of tax or expenditure limits.  On average, 
states’ adoptions of these policies did not decrease the magnitude of spillovers between 
school districts.25  This result may stem from the fact that tax and expenditure limits are 
typically binding for only a subset of districts in a particular state, and districts might be 
strongly influenced by their neighbors when deciding whether to raise the maximum 
allowable revenues.   
 
                                                 
25 I defined states as restricting districts’ ability to increase expenditures if the state limited district expenditures, 
limited district revenues, or limited both local property taxes and property value assessments.  This classification 
is similar to one adopted by Figlio (1997) and by Downes (2007).  Like Downes, I use information presented 
by Mullins and Wallin (2004) to identify the timing of states’ adoptions and removals of these policies.  While 
the adoption of these policies is certainly non-random, this specification assumes that their adoption is not 
related to unobserved variables which influence the magnitude of fiscal competition.  Controlling for state-
specific slopes of fiscal spillovers and controlling for year-specific slopes of fiscal spillovers, one cannot reject the 
null hypothesis (p ≤ .05) that states’ tax/expenditure limits do not affect fiscal spillovers between districts.  The 
sign of the estimates are actually consistent with state limits increasing spillovers, as the policies are associated 
with a 11.3 cent increase in spillovers for the all-neighbor IV model (6.4 cent standard error) and a 17.5 cent 
increase for the out-of-state neighbor IV model (21.2 cent standard error). 
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| 6 | CONCLUSION 
istricts appear to directly respond to changes in neighboring districts’ revenues.  The 
largest responses to mean changes in the revenues of nearby districts are found when 
the set of “neighboring” districts is based on districts located within a thirty mile 
radius.  Point estimates suggest that, on average, a one dollar increase in the mean revenues 
per pupil among a district’s neighbors will cause the district to increase per pupil operating 
revenues by about 20 cents.  Conservative estimates, which are as low as 14 cents, are based 
on predicted changes for out-of-state neighboring districts’ spending and may understate 
overall fiscal spillovers because some districts are less responsive to out-of-state neighbors’ 
behavior than other neighbors’ behavior.  Other estimates are based on predicted changes for 
all neighboring districts’ spending.  These results are robust to a variety of specifications, 
several of which suggest that the mean level of fiscal spillovers could be slightly greater than 
20 cents.   
 
There is a great deal of heterogeneity in the size of these fiscal responses depending on the 
initial relative position of a district’s revenues compared to those of its neighbors.  The 
responses are much greater in districts that were already outspending their neighbors.  As 
expected, there is not any evidence of fiscal responses from districts lacking local control over 
their public school operating revenues.  Fiscal spillovers are slightly greater in districts using 
direct local democracy than in districts where elected representatives determine the size of 
local taxes and spending.  Spillovers between in-state, neighboring districts are smaller in 
metropolitan areas than in non-metropolitan areas, and additional analyses suggest that this 
is at least partially due to residential sorting.  In metropolitan areas, where households may 
be especially mobile across district lines, an increase in the mean revenues of nearby, in-state 
districts leads to a decrease in a district’s own median household income.  General 
equilibrium effects of neighboring districts’ spending changes are an important topic for 
further study.  Fiscal spillovers may be related to non-residential property wealth, which has 
been an understudied topic due to the scarcity of district-level data accurately measuring the 
non-residential portion of the property tax base.  Future research might also investigate fiscal 
spillovers between private schools and public schools.     
 
This paper’s findings concerning the size and direction of local fiscal spillovers have 
important implications for the optimal design of school finance plans.  Policies that focus on 
increasing revenues in relatively low-spending districts could indirectly lead to substantial 
increases in the revenues of other, nearby districts.  Policy makers hoping to narrow 
expenditure gaps across districts must recognize that narrowing these gaps is akin to hitting a 
moving target.  When policies aim at boosting the expenditures of low spending districts, the 
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Table 1: Changes in School District Operating Revenues per Pupil, 1972-2002 
 
Correlation with Change in Operating Revenues per Pupil 
Among… 
Time Period Mean 












1972-77 -1,876 1,833 .516 .515 .287 
1977-82 2,666 2,060 .518 .517 .328 
1982-87 1,490 3,418 .646 .656 .138 
1987-92 571 3,945 .760 .767 .293 
1992-97 594 1,609 .341 .343 .074 
1997-2002 1,425 1,748 .269 .275 .051 
 
 22
Table 2:  Estimates of Fiscal Spillovers between U.S. School Districts 
 
 OLS Instrumental Variables Model Identified Using… 
 
 





Out-of-state neighbors in 
states with major, unique 
finance changes  
     
.351  .268 .073 .092 (1) Contiguous School Districts 
    (N=65,947) (.007)  (.010) (.043) (.071) 
     
.331  .217 .138 .084 (2) Districts within a 20 Mile Radius 
    (N=63,200) (.007)  (.010) (.045) (.077) 
      
.271  .211 .146 .137 (3) Districts within a 20 Mile Radius and 
with Similar Median Household Income 
    (N=60,522) (.007) 
 (.010) (.044) (.072) 
      
.384  .233 .219 .271 (4) Districts within a 30 Mile Radius 
     (N=65,566) (.008)  (.011) (.038) (.062) 
      
.312  .230 .174 .272 (5) Districts within a 30 Mile Radius and 
with Similar Median Household Income 
     (N=64,383) (.008) 
 
(.011) (.037) (.060) 
      
 
Notes to Table 2:  Each cell represents a separate regression and reveals the estimated change in a district’s 
operating revenue per pupil from a one dollar increase in the average operating expenditures per pupil among 
neighboring districts during five year intervals from 1972 to 2002.  Each regression has a sample size of 
65,566, since observations are included even if they do not have any relevant neighbors.  All values are in year 
2000 dollars.  Each regression controls for state-year fixed effects, as well as for the state-year specific effects of 
demographic variables.  The regressions also control for recent district re-organizations.  The sample excludes 
districts which lack much local discretion over operating revenues per pupil. 
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Table 3:  Additional Estimates of Fiscal Spillovers between Districts Located within Thirty 
Miles of each other Across State Borders 
 
 All out-of-state 
neighbors 
Out-of-state neighbors 
in states with major, 
unique finance changes 
Out-of-state neighbors 
with high inter-state 
residential mobility 
.219 .271 .370 Baseline 
 (.038) (.062) (.074) 
    
.142 .274 .200 Controlling for border-
year fixed effects (.055) (.094) (.098) 
 
Notes to Table 3: See Notes to Table 2.  Neighboring districts are defined as having high inter-state 
residential mobility if they were above the median rate of inter-state moves for border districts based 




Table 4:  Heterogeneous Estimates of Fiscal Spillovers Based on Initial Characteristics 
Compared to Neighbors or Based on Location in a Metropolitan Area 
 















(i)  Di =1 if District Initially Had Lower Median Household Income than Average of Neighbors’ Median 
Houshold Income 
 
.262 .174 .179 Predicted Change in Mean Neighbors’ Revenues 
 (.044) (.060) (.011) 
-.073 -.058 .001    “     “      “   * Di 
(.038) (.039) (.009) 
.013 .012 .016 Di 
 (.019) (.019) (.019) 
    
(ii)  Di = 1 if District Initially Has a Greater Median Household Income Than Every Neighbors’ Median 
Household Income  
 
.246 .169 .181 Predicted Change in Mean Neighbors’ Revenues 
(.039) (.057) (.010) 
-.228 -.167 -.021    “     “      “   * Di 
(.076) (.081) (.017) 
Di -.003 -.010 -.007 
 (.035) (.036) (.037) 
    
(iii)   Di = 1 if  District Initially Had Lower Revenues per Pupil than Avg. Neighbors’ Revenues per Pupil 
 
.508 .376 .289 Predicted Change in Mean Neighbors’ Revenues 
(.039) (.054) (.010) 
-.278 -.250 -.106    “     “      “   * Di 
(.034) (.035) (.007) 
1.10 1.11 1.17 Di 
(.014) (.014) (.015) 
    
(iv)  Di = 1 if District is Located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (based on MSA boundaries in 2001) 
 
.162 .119 .238 Predicted Change in Mean Neighbors’ Revenues 
(.042) (.058) (.011) 
.160 .081 -.109    “     “      “   * Di 
(.049) (.057) (.011) 
-.030 -.020 .068 Di 
(.022) (.022) (.023) 
 
Notes to Table 4:  Neighboring districts are defined as those located within a 30 mile radius.  Each 
column of each panel provides three estimated coefficients from a single regression.   
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Table 5:  Heterogeneous Estimates of Fiscal Spillovers Based on Local Democracy 
 
    
 
 
Form of Local Democracy for 





Out-of-state Neighbors IV 
controlling for state-year 





   
(1) No Local Control -.080 -.091 .084 
 (.165) (.197) (.065) 
    
.153 .122 .167 (2) Representative Democracy 
          or Mixed Democracy (.055) (.082) (.012) 
    
.260 .142 .189 (3) Direct Democracy Only 
(.053) (.076) (.016) 
 
Notes to Table 5:  Point estimates are from regressions analogous to the models in the second and 
third columns of Table 2, except that the sample is divided based on districts’ form of local 
democracy for determining operating expenditures.  The sample also excludes observations for 
districts that recently changed their form of local democracy; observations are dropped if the form of 
local democracy changed within the past ten years or next five years.  Similar to panel (4) of Table 2, 
neighboring districts are defined as districts located within a thirty mile radius.   
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Appendix:  Summary Statistics for School District Characteristics, 
Means with Standard Deviations in Italics 
 
 Full Sample Districts in sample with at 
least one out-of-state neighbor 
within 30 milesa 
 
Number of Districts 
 
65,566 21,776 
Operating revenues per pupil  










   
Variables based on the 1980 Censusb   




















a  In this paper’s main analyses, neighboring districts are defined as districts with centroid coordinates 
located within thirty miles of each other. 
b Census variables are limited to the 1980 year in this table in order to facilitate comparisons of 
characteristics of districts with or without out-of-state neighbors.  The actual regression analyses 
control for the state-by-year effects of variables based on the immediate prior Census data (1970, 
1980, or 1990). 
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